وَهُمْand theyعَلِمُواknewكَمَاasعَلِمَhe knewوَإِنْand ifاخْتَلَفَتْdifferedاللُّغَاتُthe languages
And they knew as he knew, even though the languages differed.
وَقَدْAndأَوْحَىinspiredاللَّهُGodإِلَىtoمُوسَىMosesبِالْعِبْرَانِيَّةِin Hebrew
And God inspired Moses in Hebrew,
وَإِلَىand toمُحَمَّدٍMuhammadبِالْعَرَبِيَّةِin Arabic
and to Muhammad in Arabic,
وَالْجَمِيعُand allكَلَامُthe wordsاللَّهِof God
and all are the words of God.
وَقَدْAndبَيَّنَHe clarifiedاللَّهُGodبِذَٰلِكَby thatمَاwhatأَرَادَHe wantedمِنْfromخَلْقِهِHis creationوَأَمْرِهِand command.
And God clarified by that what He wanted from His creation and command.
وَإِنْAnd ifكانتْit wasهَذِهِthisاللُّغَةُlanguageلَيْسَتْis notالْأُخْرَىthe other,
And if this language is not the other,
مَعَalthoughأَنَّthatالْعِبْرَانِيَّةُHebrewمِنْis one of the closest languagesأَقْرَبَclosestاللُّغَاتِto the languagesإِلَىtoالْعَرَبِيَّةِArabic,حَتَّىevenإِنَّهَاit is closerأَقْرَبُcloserإِلَيْهَاto itمِنْthanلُغَةٍthe languageبَعْضِsomeالْعَجَمِof the non-Arabsإِلَىtoبَعْضٍsome.
Although Hebrew is one of the closest languages to Arabic, even it is closer to it than the language of some non-Arabs is to others.
فَبِالْجُمْلَةِIn general,نَحْنُweلَيْسَare notغَرَضُنَاour aimإِقَامَةَto establishالدَّلِيلِthe proofعَلَىofعَدَمِthe non-existenceذَٰلِكَ؛of that;بَلْbutيَكْفِينَاit is enough for usأَنْthatيُقَالَit is said:هَذَاthisغَيْرُis notمَعْلُومٍknownوُجُودُهُto exist,بَلْbutالإِلْهَامُthe inspirationكَافٍis sufficientفِيinالنُّطْقِthe articulationبِاللُّغَاتِof the languagesمِنْwithoutغَيْرِanyمَوَاضَعَةٍprior arrangementمُتَقَدِّمَةٍin advance.
In general, our aim is not to establish proof of the non-existence of that; but it is enough for us to say: this is not known to exist, but inspiration is sufficient for articulating languages without prior arrangement.
وَإِذَاAnd ifهَذَاthisتَوْقِيفًاis a stoppage,فَلْيُسْمَlet it be calledتَوْقِيفًاa stoppage,وَحِينَئِذٍand thenفَمَنْwhoeverادَّعَىclaimsوَضْعًاa prior establishmentمُتَقَدِّمًاbeforeالْأَجْنَاسِthe genres,فَقَدْhas saidقَالَwhatمَاhe has no knowledge of.لَاCertainly not,عِلْمٌthe knownلَهُto himبِهِabout it,وَإِنَّمَاbutالْمَعْلُومُthe knownبِلَاwithoutرَيْبٍdoubt
And if this is a stoppage, then let it be called a stoppage, and then whoever claims a prior establishment of the genres has said what he has no knowledge of; certainly the known is known without doubt.
عَلَىaboutالاِسْتِخْدَامِthe usageسُمِّيَis called.جَمِيعٌAllهُوَisالِاسْتِعْمَالُthe usage.ثُمَّThenهَؤُلَاءِtheseيَقُولُونَsay:تَتَمَيَّزُthe truth is distinguishedالْحَقِيقَةُthe truthمِنْfromالْمَجَازِthe metaphorبِاَلِكَفَايَةِby the sufficiencyبِالْلَّفْظِof the word,فَإِذَاthen ifدَلَّit indicatesالْلَّفْظُthe wordبِمُجَرَّدِهِby itselfفَهُوَthen it isحَقِيقَةٌthe truth,وَإِذَاand ifلَمْit does notيَدُلَّindicateإِلَّاexceptمَعَwithالْقَرِينَةِthe context,فَهُوَthen it isمَجَازٌa metaphor.
Then these say: the truth is distinguished from the metaphor by the sufficiency of the word, and if the word indicates by itself, then it is the truth, and if it does not indicate except with the context, then it is a metaphor.
وَهَذَاAnd thisأَمْرٌmatterمُتَعَلِّقٌrelatedبِاسْتِعْمَالِto the usageاللَّفْظِof the wordفِيinالْمَعْنَىthe meaningلَاnotبِوَضْعٍby the establishmentمُتَقَدِّمٍprior.
And this matter is related to the usage of the word in the meaning, not by a prior establishment.
ثُمَّThenيُقَالُit is saidثَانِيًا:secondly:هَذَاthisالتَّقْسِيمُdivisionلَاdoes notحَقِيقَةٌhave truthلَهُto it,وَلَيْسَand there is notلِمَنْfor anyoneفَرْقٌwho differentiates with itبَيْنَهُمَاbetween themحَدٌّa limitصَحِيحٌcorrectيُمَيِّزُto distinguishبِهِwith itبَيْنَbetweenهَذَاthisوَهَذَاand that.
Then it is said secondly: this division does not have truth to it, and there is not for anyone who differentiates between them a correct limit with which to distinguish between this and that.
فَعُلِمَThen it is knownأَنَّthatهَذَاthisالتَّقْسِيمُdivisionبَاطِلٌis false,وَهُوَand it isتَقْسِيمٌa divisionمِنْofلَمْwho did notيَتَصَوَّرconceiveمَاwhatيَقُولُhe saysبَلْbutيَتَكَلَّمُspeaksبِلَاwithoutعِلْمٍknowledge.
Then it is known that this division is false, and it is a division of one who did not conceive what he says, but speaks without knowledge.
فَهُمْThey areمُبْتَدِعَةٌinnovatorsفِيinالشَّرْعِthe lawمُخَالِفُونَopposedلِلْعَقْلِto reason,وَذَٰلِكَand thatأَنَّهُمْthey said:الْحَقِيقَةُthe truthاللَّفْظُis the wordالْمُسْتَعْمَلُusedفِيinمَاwhatوُضِعَ لَهُit was established for,وَالمَجَازُand the metaphor: isمَاwhatالْمُسْتَعْمَلُis usedفِيinغَيْرِother thanمَاwhatوُضِعَ لَهُit has been established for,فَاحْتَاجُواso they neededإِلَىtoإِثْبَاتِproveالوَضْعِthe establishmentالسَّابِقِprecedingعَلَىtoالِاسْتِعْمَالِthe usage,وَهَذَاand thisيَتَعَذَّرُis difficult.
They are innovators in the law opposed to reason, and that they said: the truth is the word used for what it was established for, and the metaphor is what is used in other than what it has been established for, so they needed to prove the preceding establishment prior to usage, and this is difficult.
ثُمَّThenيَقْسِمُونَthey divideالْحَقِيقَةَthe truthإِلَىintoلُغَوِيَّةٍlinguistic,وَعُرْفِيَّةٍand customary,وَأَكْثَرُهُمْand most of themيَقْسِمُهَاdivide itإِلَىintoثَلاثٍthree:لُغَوِيَّةٍlinguistic,شَرْعِيَّةٍlegal,وَعُرْفِيَّةٍand customary.
Then they divide the truth into linguistic, and customary, and most of them divide it into three: linguistic, legal, and customary.
فَالْحَقِيقَةُSo the truthالْعُرْفِيَّةُthe customary: isهِيَit isمَاwhatصَارَhas becomeالَلَّفْظُthe wordدَالًّاindicativeفِيهاin itعَلَىofالْمَعْنَىthe meaningبِالْعُرْفِby customلَاnotبِاللُّغَةِby language,وَذَٰلِكَand thatالْمَعْنَىthe meaningيَكُونُisتَارَةًsometimesأَعْمَbroaderمِنَthanاللُّغَوِيِّthe linguisticوَتَارَةًand sometimesأَخَصُّmore specific,وَتَارَةًand sometimesيَكُونُisمُبَايِنًاcontradictoryلَهُto it.لَكِنَButبَيْنَهُمَاbetween themعَلَاقَةٌthere is a relationshipاسْتُعْمِلَتْusedلِأَجْلِهَاfor its sake,
So the customary truth is what the word has become indicative of the meaning in it by custom, not by language, and that meaning sometimes is broader than the linguistic, and sometimes is more specific, and sometimes is contradictory to it, but between them there is a relationship for which it was used.
فَالْأَوَّلُSo the first:مَثَلٌfor exampleلَفْظٌthe wordالرَّقَبَةُthe neckوَالرَّأْسُand the headوَنَحْوُهُمَاand similar terms,كَانَwasيُسْتَعْمَلُusedفِيinالْعُضْوِthe body partالْمَخْصُوصِspecific,ثُمَّthenصَارَbecameيُسْتَعْمَلُusedفِيinجَمِيعِallالْبَدَنِthe body.
So the first: for example, the word for the neck and the head and similar terms, was used for a specific body part, then it became used for all of the body.
وَالثَّانِيAnd the second:مَثَلٌfor exampleلَفْظٌthe wordالدَّابَّةُthe creatureوَنَحْوُهَاand similar terms,كَانَwasيُسْتَعْمَلُusedفِيinكُلِّeveryمَاthingدَبَّthat crawled,ثُمَّthenصَارَbecameيُسْتَعْمَلُusedفِيinعُرْفِthe customبَعْضِof someالنَّاسِpeopleفِيinذَوَاتِthe beingsالأَرْبَعِof four legs,وَفِيand inعُرْفِthe customبَعْضِof someالنَّاسِpeopleفِيinالْفَرَسِthe horse,وَفِيand inعُرْفِthe customبَعْضِهِمof some of themفِيinالْحِمَارِthe donkey.
And the second: for example, the word for a creature and similar terms was used for every crawling thing, then it became used in the custom of some people for the four-legged beings, and in the custom of some people for the horse, and in the custom of some of them for the donkey.
وَالثَّالِثAnd the third:مَثَلٌfor exampleلَفْظٌthe wordالْغَائِطُthe excrementوَالظَّعِينَةُand the woman on a camelوَالْرَّاوِيَةُand the she-camelوَالْمِزَادَةُand the water-skin,
And the third: for example, the word for excrement, and the woman on a camel, and the she-camel, and the water-skin.